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Research·arXiv cs.CL·

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

Researchers introduce CoopEval, a benchmark testing how LLM agents behave in social dilemmas like prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. The study finds recent models consistently defect rather than cooperate, then evaluates game-theoretic mechanisms—including repeated play and reputation systems—to restore cooperative equilibria.

MentionsCoopEval · LLM agents

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CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas · Modelwire